Posted January 5th, 2010
So you’ve probably seen the news – Gartner is acquiring Burton Group. Looks like we’ll be kept whole in a variety of ways; see this note from Gene Hall. I’ll let you know more as I know.
This does bring the number of analyst firms focused on identity, privacy, and relationships down to a very small number. It will be interesting to watch how the market responds.
What is with Tuesdays in my life? 9/11 – a Tuesday. IBM buys Access360 on a Tuesday. Gartner buys Burton Group on a Tuesday. In keeping with this odd streak of Tuesdays, I think I’ll be at Toledo Lounge tonight – see you there?
Posted November 17th, 2009
A friend in the industry recently asked me for my thoughts on OpenID, InfoCards, and the US federal government’s work to consume non-government issued credentials. Letting the question rattle around in my head for a while, here’s what I’ve got so far.
My hope is that the overall ICAM initiative is successful—not because I have been eagerly waiting to interact with the federal government using some form of authenticated credential—but because we (citizens, enterprises and government) are at a pivotal moment in the history of the web. With the US government working with both the OpenID and InfoCard Foundations, there exists an opportunity to change how individuals interact with large organizations, both public and private. For the first time, individuals would be able to (even encouraged to) interact with a large organization (such as the US federal government) using an identity asserted, not by the large organization, but by the individual. In this case, the State is no longer the sole provider of identity. This breaks the monopoly that the State has had on credentials and is indicative of the future to come.
But there is a long road to walk before getting there. There are numerous concerns with these plans. Among these are notable security concerns, especially with OpenID, that the identity community is not blind to. These are not my primary concerns. Continue reading "Hopes and concerns for identity"...
Posted August 21st, 2009
A few Facebook hacks came across my desk this week. The first set are so called “rogue” applications which do the tediously predictable grab of user information followed by the equally tediously predictable spam-a-palooza. Calling such applications “rogue” is misleading. These didn’t start out okay and turn evil somewhere along the way. These apps were built to cause trouble – they are malware. Facebook has a healthy set of malware apps and the number is growing every day. You can easily spot effected Facebook users by their status messages – “Sorry for the email – my Facebook got a virus.”
The second hack is of a far more interesting class. Ronen Zilberman, a security researcher, harnessed features of the Facebook platform to unwittingly perform a man-in-the-middle attack on itself. Zilberman documents how the attack works in very clear language. You can even see a video of the attack in action. Why is this a more interesting class of attack on Facebook? First, it doesn’t require an application to be added to the victim’s Facebook profile. Second and more importantly, this attack fundamentally turns Facebook’s goals against itself.
Facebook’s mission is to “give people the power to share and make the world more open and connected.” Its business is to accomplish this mission before someone else does. This requires that Facebook provide a means to connect as many people, websites and services as possible and as fast as possible. And in the course of this social networking land-grab, it is not surprising that we have seen both Facebook malware and the Facebook’s platform being used to support anti-social behavior. The Facebook platform is optimized to provide frictionless connections and sharing of information. But as exploits for ill-purposes increase, Facebook has to act and act in a manner counter to their mission. Continue reading "The challenge in fixing Facebook’s underlying privacy problems"...
Posted June 8th, 2009
Among the sessions in this year’s Computers Freedom and Privacy conference was a panel on the recently released National review of cyber-security. Ed Felten presented three related areas that he believes have to be improved in equal measure to improve overall cyber-security:
- Product development
- System administration
- User behavior
But, to me, there was something missing from the list – product design.
Too often I have seen products whose user interface, in fact its entire user experience, was constructed after the fact. First the special sauce gets codified, then the chrome is put on and product gets a face. It is easy to recognize products that have been built in this way as they tend to expose their internal data models to users, forcing users to adopt the metaphors of the engineers that built the product in the first place. These types of products make problems internal to the product problems for the end-user and this can lead to very bad things. See Three Mile Island as an example. Poor user experience design leads to so-called “user error,” but is it really user error if the end-user is confronted with meaningless alarms, confusing error messages, and misleading feedback?
At CFP, I talked to Bruce Schneier his research that went into Beyond Fear to get a better understanding of the psychology of fear and its relation to security. As you probably know, humans (and other animals too) are fantastically bad about evaluating risk. Optimism bias and other factors cause us to either over or under-estimate risks. Combine this with the fact that how choices are presented directly influences how choices are made and you realize the crucial need to build better user experiences for security (frankly, all) products. Continue reading "The role of design in protecting cyberspace: thoughts from CFP 2009"...
Posted May 15th, 2009
No organization wants to be the first to be fined because of a new regulation. Unfortunately, that’s exactly where Kaiser Permanente finds itself. After some high profile cases of unauthorized access to celebrities’ medical records, the California legislature adopted two new privacy laws (SB 541 and AB 211); these regulations were so swiftly enacted that they contained spelling errors. Both regulations went into effect on January 1 of this year. Five months later, Kaiser Permanente has become the first enterprise to be fined under this new regime.
Regulators have levied the maximum fine, $250,000, for the recent incident involving Nadya “Octomom” Suleman. (Kevin commented on this previously.) All in all, 23 individuals looked at Ms. Suleman’s records without authorization. Of these, 15 have either been fired or resigned. And although the state regulators have fined Kaiser, they have yet to penalize any of these 23 individuals – which they can do under state law.
As reported in the LA Times, Suleman’s lawyer said:
“I think Kaiser handled it professionally. They found out, they terminated the employees, they brought it to our attention. They certainly didn’t try to hide it.“
It’s important to note that even though Kaiser acted appropriately, laws like SB 541 are clear cut: unauthorized access to medical information = fine. Do not pass Go; do not collect $200.
As we’ve said before privacy risks are real. The fines are increasing. The number of regulations is increasing. Now more than ever is the time to register for this year’s Catalyst conference so you can attend our Privacy Risks Get Real track and learn how to reduce the chance your organization will become the next “first.” Continue reading "Privacy Risks Get Real – California Privacy Laws, Octomom, and Kaiser Permanente"...
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lawyer bait I work for The Burton Group, but the postings on this blog reflect only my personal views; they do not necessarily represent the views, positions, strategies or opinions of The Burton Group or its management.
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